Doctrine, jurisprudence and evolution of the law

Abstract

As the history of law also shows, the task of legal science, in its two components of doctrine and jurisprudence, is not only to make exegesis of the law or to give its application. Indeed, jurists, especially in the constitutional field, possess a natural propensity to construct, rather than identify, law and to mediate between (normative) texts and (social) contexts. This propensity emerges even more sharply today owing, on the one hand, to a rigid, value-based constitution that demands of them previously unknown performances and, on the other hand, to a patchy yet chaotic legal framework that, due in part to external factors, nonetheless demands to be continually reassembled. Their authoritativeness and legitimacy of a technical-scientific, rather than political-democratic, nature represent not an impediment but the very prerequisite for exercising more and more a role of control, impetus, integration and even supplanting other constitutional powers, firstly Parliament.