Spunti critici sulla nuova supervision accentrata delle banche dell'eurozona

Abstract

The article, moving from the evolution of the prudential supervision of banks operating in the Union, focuses on the reasons for the recent transition from a mechanism of fragmented "harmonized" supervision to the new supervisory system, as a structural response of the Union to break the 2008 global financial crisis; to then dwell on both the features characterizing the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) referred to in EU Regulation No. 1024/13, having particular regard to the centralizing torsion of the prudential supervision function, where the tendency of the ECB is achieved marginalization of National supervisory Authorities; both on the supervisory relationship between EBC and National supervisory Authorities, with particular reference to procedural, para-judicial and judicial aspects. Finally, it focuses on the first critical issues of the SSM emerged in the application and jurisprudence, which seem to offer a number of food for thought both on the presumably destabilizing effects on the precarious post-crisis systemic balance resulting from this uncertain run-in phase of the new regulation, both on the possibility of any corrections.