Logics of agreement. Quine’s naturalism between pragmatism and a Derridean impasse
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/2845Keywords:
Quine, Derrida, Rorty, Agreement, Neo-pragmatismAbstract
A criticism of Quine’s methodology, from a neo-pragmatist’s point of view, cannot rely on the objection whereby for a historicist and holistic conception of scientific language the regulatory concept of “proximity to real data” is senseless – as Rorty believes. This latter concept would be “pragmatically” justified, in fact, as a satisfactory emerging of constant typologies of structures and relations of forces which would coincide with a “useful” agreement within Quine’s community. To show why this latter occurrence of “agreement” is problematic, therefore, we need to integrate Rorty’s holism with Derrida’s notions of dissemination and singularity of the event. Derrida’s reflection might suggest that Quine’s scientific criteria of clarity, simplicity, linearity, agreement and – consequently – the very concept of “science”, can in no way be ontologically discerned from the necessity of an ethical assessment of the event.Downloads
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Published
2014-11-04
How to Cite
Cortese, D. (2014). Logics of agreement. Quine’s naturalism between pragmatism and a Derridean impasse. Bollettino Filosofico, 29, 202–226. https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/2845
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