Analytics and continentals: a failed project?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/2837Keywords:
meta-philosophy, analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, public philosophy, tradition, scienceAbstract
The text is divided into two part. First, a brief reconsideration of the history and theory of the “analytic-continental divide” is presented, then an assessment of the contemporary situation is suggested.
In the first part, it is explained that the A-C distinction dates back to the end of the XIX century, and is completely acknowledged at the middle of the XX century. The two categories intend to capture a general divergence within the field of philosophy, a divergence that does not properly regard currents of movements or philosophical trends, but “traditions”. Two different lines of canonical authors, two conceptions of philosophy, two different philosophical stiles largely confront each other. Various projects of possible convergence have been presented (the most authoritative were the ones of Apel and Tugendhat), but they have generally remained undeveloped, basically because some different (cultural and not philosophical) controversies have been interposed, such the controversy about “post-modernism”. In the second part, it is suggested that two new factors have intervened in recent times: the globalization of knowledge, and the scientization of philosophy. To a certain extent, the emergence of the A-C question, at the middle of the XX century, was due to the announcing occurrence of both. But both globalization and scientization do make the divide, in its proper sense, to vanish. There are no traditions in philosophy yet, but there are distinct, parallel and non-communicating disciplines. So the A-C distinction lack any properly meta-philosophical significance, and also remains as a political instrument of academic dominance, that survives only nominally, mainly to authorize exclusion or inclusion of researchers and research programs.