Analytic philosophy: a genetic approximation

Authors

  • Carlos Moya Universitat de Valencia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/2840

Keywords:

analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, knowledge, Frege, Russel

Abstract

In this paper, I deal with the first member of the (at any rate, conceptually defective) distinction between analytic and continental philosophy. Although the expressions “analytic philosophy” and “analytic philosopher” are profusely used by professional philosophers, it is not obvious that they express a concept that is common to all their users. It is not even obvious that one and the same user gives them a uniform meaning on different occasions. In addition, several authors doubt that those expressions have a clear content nowadays. In this paper I will hold, instead, that considering some philosophers, and certain philosophical productions, as analytic is not completely deprived of justification. To defend this view, I will tentatively make use of a genetic characterization of analytic philosophy, according to which there is an internal, conceptual continuity between the work of authors considered as founders of the analytic tradition and an important part of the philosophy that is presently called “analytic”.

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Published

2014-11-04

How to Cite

Moya, C. (2014). Analytic philosophy: a genetic approximation. Bollettino Filosofico, 29, 138–161. https://doi.org/10.6093/1593-7178/2840